The recent attacks on United Nations peacekeepers in Lebanon highlight once again how their presence is no guarantee of security. Marc Cohen and Elise Nalbandian explore UN peacekeeping failures in DRC, Rwanda, Darfur and Haiti – and one notable success in Timor Leste.
As violent conflict sends the number of people needing humanitarian assistance surging to over 300 million, what can the international community do to prevent it?
United Nations peacekeeping missions offer a crucial tool. And while the UN itself points to the successes of its peacekeeping missions, they have too often proved ineffective because of limited mandates from the UN Security Council (UNSC), inadequate resources from donors, and, frequently, excessive bureaucratic requirements. For the civilians caught in the crossfire, the results can prove deadly.
Four missions that went wrong – with devastating consequences
The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), established in 1999, continues to operate a quarter century later. Its mandate includes protecting civilians, supporting the government in stabilizing and consolidating peace, and facilitating humanitarian assistance. But resource constraints, operational limits, and differing geopolitical interests within the UNSC regarding DRC have stymied the mission’s efforts in ensuring long-term stability.
The humanitarian consequences have been dire: one in five Congolese (23 million) people is at risk of acute food insecurity in 2024; 25 million people require humanitarian assistance; and incidents of sexual violence and abuse against children rose by 41% over the previous year in 2023. MONUSCO personnel have been implicated in sexual exploitation of Congolese women and girls.
The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), authorized in 1993, had just 2,500 troops and a limited budget. UNAMIR was aware of the arming of militias that sought to carry out killings of ethnic Tutsi people and some politically moderate Hutu people, but the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations refused to permit mission troops to disarm or engage these armed groups. Beginning in early April 1994, and continuing over 100 days, the militias massacred between 800,000 and more than a million people.
The African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Sudan (UNAMID), which was present from 2007 to 2021, likewise failed to protect civilians from bloodshed and human rights violations. UNAMID troops reportedly declined to intervene against militia attacks on civilians even when these occurred in the presence of the peacekeepers. Donors only provided UNAMID with modest resources: the mission did not have a single helicopter, yet was expected to monitor territory equivalent in size to France. UNAMID’s hybrid nature added layers of bureaucracy, and the mission proved reluctant to criticize Sudanese government repression. Despite its limitations, the end of UNAMID’s mandate has left people in the region worse off. Renewed fighting since 2023 has meant another humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur, with hundreds of thousands of people forcibly displaced and the outbreak of famine.
The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (known by its French acronym MINUSTAH) operated between 2004 and 2017. MINUSTAH had some initial success in improving the security situation, cracking down on organized crime and violent armed groups. But the mission failed to fulfill its mandate to protect human rights and advance democratic governance, and was itself implicated in human rights violations. Its troops were widely criticized for causing a cholera epidemic, and Haitians complained of MINUSTAH forces intervening in peaceful political activities.
Timor Leste and the potential for peace
Yet successful missions reveal why they must remain on the peace agenda. The UN considers its 1999 mission in Timor Leste as the gold standard of operations. Indonesia had violently occupied the former Portuguese colony in 1975, with tens of thousands of Timorese dying during more than two decades of harshly repressive rule. The UNSC unanimously approved a resolution shortly after the annexation, calling for Indonesia’s withdrawal, but this had little practical effect, given strong Australian, US, and Chinese political support for Indonesia.
Things changed after the collapse of Indonesia’s Suharto dictatorship in 1998. The UN and the Australian government helped broker an agreement between Indonesia and Portugal, still the nominal colonial power, to hold a referendum on the future of Timor-Leste in August 1999. This vote decisively supported independence, leading to a campaign of violence by pro-Indonesia militias with support of some elements of the Indonesian military. This resulted in dozens of deaths and uprooted 200,000 people as refugees.
The Indonesian government agreed to allow a multi-national force, the International Force East Timor, led by Australia, to restore order and address humanitarian needs, in accordance with UN resolutions. In October 1999, under the terms of UNSC Resolution 1272, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) took command of a peacekeeping force of 9,000 and administered the territory as a UN Trust. UNTAET oversaw the writing of a constitution and elections, guaranteed security and the rule of law, and facilitated refugee returns. In May 2002, UNTAET turned administration over to the newly elected government.
The path to effective peacekeeping
What lessons should the UNSC draw from its peacekeeping success in Timor Leste to avoid the kinds of problems faced in DRC, Rwanda, Darfur, and Haiti, amongst other crises? Scholars and policy analysts have written extensively on the ingredients needed for effective peacekeeping.
Obviously, a favourable geopolitical environment is important. The end of the Cold War meant that the international community no longer turned a blind eye to Indonesian human rights violations in Timor Leste. In addition, adequate resources are absolutely essential. Missions must not only have the necessary budget, but also the troops and equipment needed for effective operations in the specific context; a large territory such a Darfur will need many more peacekeepers than a small one such as Timor Leste. Effective leadership and a robust mandate are likewise crucial for missions to carry out peacebuilding activities and security enforcement. The former may include an expansive role in assisting a major political transition. Such efforts must also support local civil society initiatives, engaging women as well as men, in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. At the same time, the mission mandate must centre protection of civilians and upholding human rights, while incorporating strong accountability mechanisms.
As Oxfam notes in its recent report, Vetoing Humanity, with conflict driving the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance to reach 339 million in 2023, the task could not be more urgent.
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Read the recent Oxfam report: Vetoing Humanity: How a few powerful nations hijacked global peace and why reform is needed at the UN Security Council